Abstract -This paper estimates net marginal Social Security tax rates, by age, for the cohorts of workers covered by Social Security in , 2010, 2020 and 2030. The paper updates and extends Feldstein and Samwick's (1992 study. In contrast to their study, which found net tax rates much higher for young workers relative to older workers in 1990, this paper fi nds net tax rates to be relatively uniform across age groups. This paper's inclusion of the Disability Insurance program, the projected decline in future mortality rates, and the continued phase-in of higher retirement ages accounts for our sharply differing conclusions.
INTRODUCTION

I
n an exhaustive and infl uential study, Feldstein and Samwick (1992) document a substantial variation in net marginal social security tax rates across age, sex, dependency status, retirement plans and income. Although workers generally face the same statutory tax rate over their lifetimes, the complex rules governing the relationship between benefi ts and tax payments result in large differences in the net marginal tax rate, which is the difference between statutory tax rates and the additional benefi ts associated with an additional dollar of earnings.
1 This paper focuses on one of their most striking results: younger workers in 1990 faced considerably higher net marginal tax rates than older workers. In their benchmark case, Feldstein and Samwick fi nd that for single men, the net marginal tax rate was 6.7 percent at age 25, but only 2.3 percent at age 60, a gap of 4.4 percentage points. The gap was even greater for single women (5.0) and men with dependent spouses (5.7). 2 Feldstein and Samwick's empirical conclusions led them to suggest adjusting statutory tax rates to equalize the net marginal tax rates faced by younger and older workers.
Although disparate treatment of younger and older workers under the Social Security Program raises a number of policy issues, Feldstein and Samwick's focus on differences in marginal tax rates refl ects a concern over the potential for labor supply distortions. A pattern of high net marginal tax rates on younger workers and lower tax rates on older workers could affect the allocation of work effort within households and may affect the allocation of work effort over a worker's lifetime. These labor supply distortions would remain a policy concern even if intergenerational distribution effects were mitigated by the presence of altruistically linked households. 3 This paper reexamines how net marginal tax rates vary with age in light of a number of signifi cant changes that have occurred over the ten years since Feldstein and Samwick's study. First, since the time of their study, estimated survival rates have increased. Because younger workers are more likely to survive to retirement age, this has differentially increased expected marginal retirement benefi ts to younger workers. Second, the scheduled phase-in of the higher retirement age (from age 65 to age 67) has progressed through the age brackets. The higher retirement age has begun to be applied to older workers, lessening one source of the disparity in net marginal tax rates. Finally, and most signifi cantly, the Disability Program, which Feldstein and Samwick's study ignores, has grown dramatically. 4 Marginal benefi ts rates under the Disability Insurance program turn out to be higher for younger workers than for older workers. Including Disability Insurance taxes and benefi ts serves to make the profi le of net marginal Social Security tax rates signifi cantly more equal across age groups. Perhaps the most signifi cant fi nding of this study is that marginal benefi t rates under the Disability Insurance program are much higher for younger workers relative to older workers. Two key features of the Disability Insurance program account for this somewhat surprising result. First, disability awards are based not on the level of contributions in the year of disability, but on all contributions up to the time of disability. Second, disability awards and benefi ts last only up to retirement age. These features mean that additional income earned by 25-year-old workers has a contingency value for any disability award over the subsequent 40 years. Income earned by 55-year-old workers only infl uences the level of awards made in the subsequent ten years. The value of disability payments is higher for the young simply because they are more likely to receive those benefi ts. 5 Further, workers who receive disability awards while young are more likely to remain on disability rolls for lengthy time periods. The length of disability spells for older workers is limited to the years until retirement. The expected time on disability for a 25-year-old worker is approximately four times that of a 55-year-old worker. 3 See Nichols, Clingman, and Glanz (2001) for recent estimates of the distributional effects of Social Security across cohorts. Their study examines the total return to Social Security contributions, rather than the marginal returns examined in this paper. Note that because of the progressivity of benefi t schedules, net marginal tax rates will generally exceed net average tax rates. 4 After falling the in 1980s, the number of Disability Insurance (DI) benefi ciaries rose 56 percent over the 1990s.
In contrast, Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) benefi ciaries rose less than nine percent. The combined Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax rate has remained at 12.4, but the portion earmarked for DI has increased from 1.2 to 1.8 and the rate earmarked for OASI has fallen from 11.2 to 10.6. 5 At the extreme, a worker who is fi ve months from retirement age receives no benefi ts whatsoever from additional disability contributions. Even if the worker were to become disabled immediately, the fi ve-month mandatory waiting period means that the worker cannot receive any disability benefi ts. 6 Expected time of disability rolls is almost two years for 25-year-olds and less than seven months for 55-year-old workers. (Source: Author's calculations from the data on incidence, recovery and mortality given in Zayatz (1999).) Basing Disability Insurance benefi ts on the worker's average earnings further increases marginal benefi t rates faced by the young. Additional earnings of younger workers can have dramatically larger effects on average income and, hence, larger effects on the level of benefi ts. If benefi ts are based on fi ve years of earnings, each additional dollar of earnings raises average earnings by 20 cents. For an older worker with benefi ts based on 35 years of earnings, each additional dollar of earnings raises average earnings by less than three cents. Disability awards while young are, therefore, much more sensitive to the level of contributions in each year. In summary, the marginal benefi t of Disability Insurance contributions is greater for the young because they have a greater chance of eventually receiving benefi ts, they have a greater chance of remaining disabled for lengthy time periods, and their contributions can have a greater effect on the actual level of benefi ts.
The fi rst section of the paper reviews the tax and benefi t rules for the OASI and DI programs. The second section derives an approximation for the marginal retirement and disability benefi ts from covered Social Security earnings. The third section focuses on how including the DI program reduces the age gap in net Social Security tax rates and the fourth section focuses on the effects of projected declines in mortality rates. The fi nal section estimates how marginal tax rates will evolve over the years 2000 to 2030, accounting for declines in mortality rates and the scheduled phase-in of higher retirement ages. A discussion and conclusion follow.
SOCIAL SECURITY RULES AND THE MARGINAL BENEFITS OF DISABILITY AND RETIREMENT
This section provides a brief discussion of the rules for contribution and benefi t rates under the OASI and DI programs. See Feldstein and Samwick for a more comprehensive discussion and the Social Security Handbook for a full explanation. I consider the three distinct types of workers studied by Feldstein and Samwick: male workers with no dependent spouse, female workers with no dependent spouse, and male workers with a dependent spouse. In the latter case, the dependent spouse is two years younger than the worker and there are no children. Focusing on these cases avoids some of the complicated provisions for potential auxiliary beneficiaries, i.e., dependent parents and children.
The discussion of Social Security benefi ts is simplifi ed in several respects. First, I focus on rules affecting those working in 2000 and beyond. This allows me to ignore the many special rules applying only to those already retired in 2000. Second, because my concern is with marginal tax rates, I ignore any benefi ts that are not tied to the level of contributions.
The full, statutory payroll tax rate on covered employment is 15.3 percent, with shares equally split between the employee's share of 7.65 percent and employer's share of 7.65 percent. Self-employed workers pay the full 15.3 percent. Of this 15.3 percent, 2.9 percent goes to the Medicare fund, 1.8 percent to the Disability Insurance fund and 10.6 percent to the Old-Age and Survivors trust fund. The 12.4 percent combined rate for DI and OASI is levied up to a maximum income that is, in 2000, $76,200, but there is no upper income limit on the Medicare portion.
The distinction between the statutory tax rate and the net marginal tax arises because OASI and DI benefi ts, in many cases, depend on the level on contributions. The net marginal tax rate takes into account the increase in the expected value of future retirement, survivors and disability benefi ts associated with additional tax payments. From the standpoint of labor supply decisions, these net marginal benefi ts serve to reduce the net marginal tax rate. Like Feldstein and Samwick, I omit the Medicare portion because Medicare benefi ts are not tied to the level of contributions.
Workers are first eligible for retirement at age 62 with reduced benefits, but must wait for the "normal retirement age" for full benefi ts. Normal Retirement Age (NRA) is 65 for workers born before 1937. It rises in two-month increments for workers born between 1938 and 1943, is 66 for workers born between 1943 and 1954, rises again in two-month increments for workers born between 1955 and 1960, whereupon it reaches the new, normal retirement age of 67. In estimating benefi ts, I assume all workers and spouses retire at the normal retirement age.
To determine the level of retirement benefi ts, the Social Security Administration fi rst computes a measure of lifetime earnings-Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME). Annual earnings from covered employment, from age 21 to age 60, up to the maximum subject to OASDI taxes, are adjusted to reflect changes in the average wage level. Specifi cally, earnings in each year prior to age 60 are multiplied by the ratio of the National Average Wage Index (NAWI) in the year the worker turned 60 to the NAWI in that year. Earnings from age 60 onward are included without adjustment. The top 35 years (the computation years) are then averaged and divided by 12 to obtain the worker's AIME.
The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is then obtained from AIME using a formula with three distinct rate classes. For those fi rst eligible in 2000, the PIA is 90 percent of the fi rst $531 of AIME, plus 32 percent of the next $2,671, plus 15 percent of any amount over $3,202. The PIA, with adjustments for the cost of living, is the monthly retirement benefi t for those retiring at the normal retirement age. Upon retirement, dependent spouses receive half of this amount, and widows or widowers receive the full amount earned by the deceased worker.
Disability benefits are, with certain amendments, essentially the same as retirement benefi ts. AIME are computed with earnings adjusted by the level of the NAWI two years before the onset of disability. The computation years are the actual years worked from age 21, minus one for every fi ve years of work. The exceptions are that the number of years must be a least two and at most 35. Years worked before age 21 are counted if these years are necessary to make the worker eligible for disability coverage. Benefi ts are adjusted to the cost of living and continue until recovery, death or attainment of normal retirement age. At normal retirement age, disability benefi ts are converted to retirement benefi ts and are paid out of the OASI fund rather than the DI fund.
To summarize, consider the effect of an extra dollar of earnings on a worker's PIA for an individual of age n, in year t, receiving an award in year a. To obtain this marginal Primary Insurance amount, MPIA, the dollar is multiplied by the relative value of the national wage index, wi(a,n,t), equal to NAWI(t + 60 -n)/NAWI(t) for retirement and NAWI(t + a -2 -n)/NAWI(t) for disability benefi ts. This amount is then multiplied by the marginal rate class, MRC, (90, 0.32 or 0.15), and then divided by the relevant number of computation years, CY(a,n) to obtain:
CY(a,n)
The MPIA is the effect of an additional dollar in covered earnings on the annual benefi ts awarded to disabled workers and workers with no dependents retiring at the normal retirement age.
NET RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY TAX RATES
Social Security rules determine the amount of the awards, but the value of the awards depends on discount rates, marginal tax rates on benefi ts and the probabilities of survival, disability and recovery. Because the major features of the benefi t programs are indexed to either wage rates or the price level, I follow Feldstein and Samwick and estimate expected benefi ts entirely in real terms. The Real Marginal Primary Insurance Amount is, thus,
CY(a,n)
Here, rw(a,n,t) is the wage indexation formula, wi(a,n,t), adjusted for infl ation. For workers without dependents, this is the response, in real terms, of awards to an additional dollar of Social Security earnings.
To obtain the expected present value of these benefi ts, we must account for the probability of obtaining the award, discount by the number of years until the award is given, and adjust for the expected duration of the award. The Expected Real Marginal Benefi t of a dollar of Social Security earnings, ERMB, for an individual age n in year t is the sum of the marginal retirement and disability benefi ts:
The fi rst term in equation [3] gives the marginal retirement benefi ts. The expected value of marginal awards is obtained by multiplying by the probability of survival to retirement age, Pr s (NR(n,t)|n,t). The present value of the award is obtained by multiplying by the real, after-tax discount factor, β NR(n,t)-n . Finally, the value of the stream of current and future benefi ts is obtained by multiplying by the annuity value of an additional real dollar of benefi ts, AV R (n, t):
The annuity value accounts for probability of survival after obtaining the award and the marginal tax rate on Social Security earnings, τ(n,t).
Examining the fi rst term in equation [3] reveals why marginal retirement benefi ts are higher for older workers. First, because older workers have fewer years to retirement, both the probability of survival, Pr s (NR(n,t)|n,t), and the discount factor, β NR(n,t)-n , will be larger. Further, because currently older workers face an earlier retirement age, the annuity value of retirement benefi ts, AV R (n,t), will be greater. The scheduled rise in retirement ages will mitigate this tendency as older workers begin to face higher retirement ages. Projected future decreases in mortality rates will also differentially raise the marginal benefi t to the young by raising the probability of the young surviving to retirement age.
The second term in [3] is the expected marginal benefi t from disability insurance. The marginal value of the contingent benefi ts is obtained by multiplying the marginal benefi t in each year, RMPIA(a -2, n,t), by the probability of obtaining the award, Pr d (a|n,t), discounting by the number of years until the award, β a-n , and multiplying by the annuity value of benefi ts:
The annuity value depends on the probability of remaining disabled (and surviving), Pr sd ( j|a,t) , and the marginal tax rate on benefi ts. The full value of benefi ts is the sum over all future years.
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Inspection of the second term in equation [3] reveals why the marginal benefi ts of Disability Insurance are likely to decrease with age. First, there are simply more terms in the sum for younger workers. The young have a higher chance of actually receiving disability benefi ts. Second, although the probability of becoming disabled is small at younger ages, the annuity value of those benefi ts, AV d (a,t), can be quite large. Estimates in Zayatz (1999) fi nd the expected time on disability for a 25-year-old male is almost 23 years, whereas the expected time on DI rolls for a 60-year-old is less than fi ve years. Finally, computation years, CY(a,n), are lower for workers receiving disability awards at a young age. The real marginal benefi t terms, RMPIA(a -2, n,t), associated with early spells of disability will, therefore, be much larger.
NET MARGINAL TAX RATES IN THE YEAR 2000
In this section, I provide updated estimates of net marginal tax rates faced by typical workers in the year 2000 using essentially Feldstein and Samwick's methodology, except that I include the taxes and benefits of the Disability Insurance program and use updated estimates of survival probabilities. I calculate net marginal tax rates separately for males, for females and for males with a dependent spouse. Estimates are broken down by age from 21 to 64, by marginal rate classes (0.90, 0.32 and 0.15) and by three possible real after-tax discount rates two, three and four percent. In each case, the net marginal retirement tax rate (OASI) is the statutory rate of 10.6 percent minus the value of the expected marginal retirement benefit. The net marginal disability rate (DI) is the statutory rate of 1.8 percent minus the value of the expected marginal DI benefi t. The combined net marginal tax rate (OASDI) is the statutory tax rate of 12.4 percent minus the sum of expected marginal benefi ts. Figure 1 presents the disability, retirement and combined net marginal tax rates for middle-income workers aged 21 to 64 years. These workers are assumed to be in the 32 percent marginal rate class, face a 15 percent marginal federal income tax rate and discount future income with an after-tax real interest rate of two percent. The estimates are a weighted average of marginal tax rates faced by males (no dependents), females (no dependents) and males (dependent spouse), with weights based on estimated percentages of each group working in 2000.
Net marginal tax rates have a humpshaped pattern, with net rates initially rising, reaching a maximum for workers in their mid-thirties, and then falling steadily until retirement. Feldstein and Samwick's basic fi nding on net retirement taxes remains evident, with net OASI taxes falling from fi ve percent at age 21 to close to minus one percent (a net subsidy) at age 64. In contrast, the net disability tax rate rises monotonically from minus 1.5 percent at age 21 to nearly the full statutory tax rate of 1.8 percent at age 64. Comparing 21-and 64-year-old workers, including the DI program, reduces the six percentage point gap in OASI to a 2.5 percentage point gap in the full OASDI program. Table 1 presents detailed estimates of net marginal tax rates faced by workers in the 32 percent marginal benefi t rate class. Approximately 55 percent of males and 75 percent of females retiring at 65 in 2000 were in this class. The discount factor, β, is computed using real, after-tax interest rates of two, three, or four percent, refl ecting the range of after-tax real interest rates used in Coronado, Fullerton and Glass (2000) and the references cited therein.
Many of Feldstein and Samwick's basic conclusions continue to hold in year 2000. Female workers, because they have lower mortality rates, expect considerably higher marginal retirement benefi ts and, hence, face lower marginal retirement tax rates. Male workers with a dependent spouse expect considerably higher marginal retirement benefi ts and, in consequence, often face negative marginal tax rates. Finally, net marginal tax rates are sensitive to the discount factor.
Higher discount rates reduce the value of future benefi ts and, therefore, raise the net marginal tax rate.
The fi rst panel of Table 1 focuses on net marginal tax rates with an after-tax real interest rate of two percent. For males, the disability tax goes from a net subsidy of -0.65 percent at age 25 to a net tax of 1.65 percent (close to the statutory rate of 1.8 percent) at age 60. Sixty-year-olds face a net DI tax rate 2.30 percentage points higher than those aged 25. This reduces the percentage point gap in net marginal tax rates from 3.90 in the OASI portion to 1.61 in the combined OASDI program. For female workers the effect of including DI is even greater. Although the incidence of disability is lower for females than for males at any age, because females have lower mortality rates and lower termination rates, the marginal benefi ts of DI are greater so net tax rates are lower. The DI tax goes from a net subsidy of -0.97 percent at 25 to a net tax of 1.67 percent at age 60. Including the disability program reduces the gap from 3.95 percentage points in the retirement portion to 1.56 in the combined program.
The next two panels of Table 1 present net marginal tax rates using after-tax real interest rates of three percent and four percent. For these higher discount rates, the marginal benefi ts of both the DI and OASI programs are considerably lower and, hence, net marginal tax rates are higher. Because the marginal benefi ts fall much more for younger workers, the rise in net marginal tax rates for the young in more pronounced. Nevertheless, including the DI program reduces the combined net marginal tax rate by 1.77 and 2.03 percentage points for males and females, respectively, when discount rates are three percent, and by 1.38 and 1.58 percentage points when discounts are four percent. For the remainder of this paper, I follow Feldstein and Samwick and take the two percent after-tax real interest rates to be the benchmark. Table 2 The gap between marginal tax rates faced by the young and old are generally smaller for workers in the 15 percent bracket. Nevertheless, disability insurance reduces the gap from 1.82 to 0.75 percent for males, from 1.97 to 0.75 percent for females and from 2.24 to 1.16 percent for In summary, using essentially the same methodology employed by Feldstein and Samwick, including DI benefi ts signifi cantly reduces the gap between net marginal tax rates faced by the young and the old. In the benchmark case, with an MRC of 32 percent and a discount rate of two percent, including DI benefi ts reduces the gap between marginal tax rates faced by 25-and 60-year-old workers by 2.3 percentage points for males with or without dependent spouses and by approximately 2.6 percentage points for females without dependents. For higher discount rates, adding DI reduces the gap by a smaller, but still signifi cant, amount. For workers in the high marginal rate class-90 percent-the overall gap is larger, but adding DI signifi cantly reduces the gap. For workers in the low marginal rate class-15 percent-the overall gap is smaller, but adding DI reduces the gap by a smaller amount.
COHORT EFFECTS AND NET SOCIAL SECURITY TAX RATES
Feldstein and Samwick estimated survival probabilities using the 1990 Social Security period life table. The estimates in the previous section followed this methodology, with updated survival probabilities from the 2000 Social Security period life table. However, neither the 1990 nor the current 2000 period life table is strictly appropriate. Period life tables give mortality rates for the current year, whereas survival probabilities depend largely on future mortality rates. Given historic and projected future declines in mortality rates, basing estimates of future survival on current period life tables could seriously underestimate survival probabilities.
This section provides estimates of net marginal tax rates using cohort survival probabilities that explicitly account for projected declines in mortality rates. Because cohort-life survival probabilities are generally higher than period-life survival probabilities, the marginal value of Social Security benefi ts will be greater and the net marginal tax rate will be correspondingly lower at all ages. However, because the young receive greater benefi ts from reductions in future mortality rates, accounting for these reductions will further lessen the age gap in net marginal tax rates.
Although the literature contains a wide rage of projections of future mortality rates, the most relevant are those specifically for the population covered by Social Security. The 2002 Trustees Report (Social Security Administration, 2002) projects future mortality rates will decline by 0.73 percent in their 'intermediate cost' scenario, the scenario they regard as most likely. They also consider morality rate reductions of 0.35 and 1.29 percent per year, in their low-and high-cost scenarios, respectively. Their projected age-sex-adjusted mortality rates for ages 65 and over are somewhat lower-0.30 percent, 0.70 percent, and 1.23 percent for the low, intermediate and high cost scenarios, respectively.
In principle, the marginal value of DI benefits should similarly be based on estimated future disability incidence and disability termination rates. However, no detailed projections by age and sex are available beyond 2010. Therefore, I base the estimates in Figure 2 and Table 3 on the conservative assumption that disability incidence rates and disability termination rates will remain at the 2000 level for the life of each worker. Figure 2 illustrates the signifi cance of mortality rate assumptions on the pattern of the net marginal tax rate across ages. Lower future mortality rates increase the Age and Mortality Reduction Assumption probability that currently young workers will survive to retirement, and increase the expected length of their retirement benefits. Lower future mortality rates imply larger marginal benefi ts and, hence, lower net marginal tax rates at each age, but the reduction in net tax rates is far more dramatic for younger ages. Comparing the period life estimates (no reduction in future morality rates) with those under Alternative III (the highest reduction in future mortality rates), the net marginal tax rates fall by almost 2.5 percentage points at age 21 while falling less that one percentage point at age 64. The resultant pattern of marginal tax rates is an almost symmetric hump shape, with low marginal tax rates for young and old and high marginal tax rates in the middle-age years. To summarize, allowing for plausible reductions in future mortality rates yields lower net marginal tax rates over all ages. However, because the reduction in net marginal tax rates is greater at younger ages, the resulting pattern of net marginal tax rates is more nearly symmetrical. Net tax rates rise with age through the early working years and then fall for the later working ages. Using projected mortality rates reduces the gap by 0.3 to 1.4 percentage points.
FUTURE NET MARGINAL TAX RATES
Over the thirty-year period from 2000 to 2030, mortality rates are projected to decline and the scheduled rise in the normal retirement age will progress through the age brackets. With no changes in the underlying benefi t formulas, these changes will have predictable consequences for both the level of net marginal tax rates and the relative marginal tax rates faced by the young and old. In this section, I project future net marginal tax rates, by age and sex, for the cohort of workers covered by Social Security in the years 2010, 2020 and 2030.
Estimates in this section focus on the benchmark case of middle-income workers (MRC = 0.32), facing a two percent real after-tax interest rate. Mortality rates are assumed to decline at the rate of 0.73 percent per year for those under 65 and 0.70 percent for those over 65, the rates assumed under the Trustee's intermediate scenario. Disability incidence and recovery rates for 2010, 2020 and 2030 are based on the projections given in Motsiopoulos and Zayatz (2001) for 2010. Figure 3 gives net marginal tax rates for all workers, using benchmark assumptions, for the years 2000, 2010, 2020 and 2030. For ages less than forty, the pattern is clear. The net marginal tax rate shrinks by about 0.3 percent each decade, falling by approximately one percentage point by 2030. Because all individuals in this group face the same retirement age of 67, the reduction refl ects only the effects of declining mortality rates on the net benefi ts from disability and retirement. For ages over forty, the pattern of net marginal tax rates is mixed. Reductions in mortality rates tend to increase benefits, but because older workers benefi t less from reductions in mortality rates, the increase in benefi ts is somewhat lower. Moreover, those with select ages over 40 will face progressively higher retirement ages over this thirtyyear period. Because of those higher retirement ages, those aged 50 in 2010 face a higher marginal tax rate than those aged 50 in 2000. Similarly, those aged 60 in 2020 face a higher marginal tax rate than those aged 60 in 2000 or 2010. The decline in net tax rates at younger ages and the slight increase in net tax rates for older ages further reduce the age gap in net Social Security tax rates.
Detailed estimates of net marginal tax rates by age and sex over the next three decades are provided in Table 4 are considerably below the 12.4 percent statutory rate. Figure 4 summarizes many of the conclusions of this paper. The net marginal tax rates on the retirement and survivors (OASI) portion for 1990, reported in Feldstein and Samwick (1992) , are sharply and monotonically declining with age. Adding the disability insurance (DI) portion and updating the estimates for current and projected mortality rates makes the pattern of net marginal tax rates more nearly hump-shaped. The net marginal tax rate rises gradually from age 21 to age 40, and then gradually declines until retirement. The gap between marginal tax rates faced by 25-and 60-year-old workers falls from the approximately 5.5 percentage points reported in Feldstein and Samwick to one percentage point in 2000. Projected net marginal tax rates for 2030 are nearly uniform across age groups, with rates only slightly lower for the youngest and oldest age groups. This paper's inclusion of the taxes and benefi ts of the Disability Insurance (DI) program accounts for much of the difference in our results. The disability portion of net marginal tax rates is often negative (a subsidy) for young workers, and rises to the full statutory rate for older workers. The marginal benefi t of DI contributions is greater for the young, because the young have a larger chance of receiving benefi ts for longer periods of time and because their contributions can have a larger effect on the level of benefi ts. Including the DI program serves to reduce the age gap by approximately 2.5 percentage points.
Using projected mortality rates (cohort survival rather than period survival rates) reduces the age gap by approximately one percentage point. The combined effect of the decline in mortality rates between 1990 and 2000 and the continued phase-in of the higher retirement ages accounts for a further one-percentage-point reduction. Declining current and future mortality rates differentially benefi t young workers and, therefore, result in larger reductions in net marginal tax rates faced by the young. The differential retirement ages faced by the young and the old, as higher retirement ages are being phased in, accounts for the remainder of the gap. Several caveats should be heeded in considering the estimates presented in this paper. First, the calculations considered here, like those of Feldstein and Samwick, are based on the currently scheduled benefi t payments. Declining mortality rates increase the marginal benefit rates for the young, but also contribute to possible insolvency of the retirement system. The phase-in of higher retirement ages reduces the benefi ts to older workers and, hence, contributes to the solvency of the retirement system, but also contributes to possible insolvency of the DI program. If the expected shortfall in revenue for the OASI and DI programs is fi nanced by increased future tax rates, the estimates presented here accurately refl ect net marginal tax rates. If the expected shortfall is met by decreasing benefi ts and, as might seem likely, the decrease in benefi ts is borne by those workers that are young in year 2000, the true net marginal tax rates could be much higher than those presented here.
The estimated net tax rates follow Feldstein and Samwick's convention of assuming each year will be counted as one of the top 35 years in calculating benefi ts. Implicitly, this assumes that indexed earnings are constant over the working years so that each year may be considered the marginal earnings year. Accounting for the life cycle pattern of earnings could be important. On average, the lowest earning years occur when workers are young. Because income earned during these lower earnings years does not count towards retirement benefi ts, this suggests that younger workers face the full statutory OASI tax rate. However, future earnings are not known with certainty. Even very low earnings would count towards retirement benefi ts if the worker experiences spells of unemployment in the future. 10 Further, earnings are also low in the years close to retirement.
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Older workers with low earnings are much more likely to know with certainty that their current earnings will not be included among the top 35 years.
The net marginal tax rate calculations are based purely on the actuarial value of benefi ts. As Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1999) point out, these conventional measures understate the true value of Social Security benefi ts because they neglect the program's ability to cushion income and consumption levels against unpredictable declines in earnings. A useful extension of this analysis would be to incorporate uncertainty in future earnings and adjust for the contingency value of disability payments.
12 Recent studies by Bound, Cullen, Nichols, and Schmidt (2002) and by Holmer (2001) suggest that the contingency value of disability payments could be signifi cantly greater than their actuarial value. Neither study explicitly examines how the valuation of disability payments varies with age, but one would expect that adjusting for the insurance value would tend to differentially raise the net marginal benefi ts of DI to younger workers. Younger workers, with a longer time horizon, are faced with more risk, are more likely to receive benefits and are generally less able to self-insure against income fl uctuations arising from disability. Adjusting for risk would likely further decrease estimates of the net marginal tax rate faced by younger workers.
Finally, it should be noted that there is considerable evidence that information on the benefi ts from Social Security is seriously incomplete, especially for younger workers (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999) . This is potentially important because it is the marginal benefi ts expected by workers, rather than the marginal benefi ts projected here, that are relevant for individual labor supply decisions. To the extent that workers are unaware of or systematically underestimate marginal future benefi ts, young workers could act as if they faced the full statutory tax rate.
Nevertheless, the overall results of this paper point to a much more even distribution of net marginal tax rates across age groups than was reported in Feldstein and Samwick. Researchers wishing to use agespecifi c marginal tax rates should consider using these updated estimates. Also, possible Social Security reforms aimed at equalizing marginal tax rates across age groups should be considered carefully in light of this updated evidence.
Benefi ts are weighted by the probability that the worker dies and the spouse has survived to the time of the award. Benefi ts are discounted by β min(NR(a,t)+2,a)-n for the number of years until the award. The annuity value of these benefi ts is: 110 [A.4 ] AV RW (a,t) = Σ β j-max (NR(a,t),a) PR ss ( j|a,t) j=max (NR(a,t),a) (1 -τ (t)), which depends on the survival probability of the dependent spouse.
One additional survivor's benefi t is omitted from the estimates in this paper. Under some circumstances, disabled widow(er)s can claim disability benefi ts based on the deceased worker's earnings.
Three additional cases, not reported here, also deserve mention: the low-earning dependent spouse, the higher earner in a dualearning couple and the lower earner in a dualearning couple. The low-earning spouse is the simplest case. He or she faces the full OASI tax because his or her earnings will have no effect on retirement or survivors benefi ts. His or her contributions will, however, affect potential disability benefi ts.
The case of dual-earner couples is more complex. Upon retirement, it is advantageous for each to take his or her own retirement benefi ts. However, in the event of the death of the higher earner, it is advantageous for the lower earner to take the spouse retirement benefits. The contributions of the higher earner, therefore, affect survivor benefi ts, but the contributions of the lower earner do not. Because the lower earner will claim survivor benefi ts, the marginal value of retirement contributions is correspondingly lower.
APPENDIX B
Survival probabilities for the worker and spouse, Pr s (j|n) and Pr ss (j|n), respectively, are taken from the 2000 Social Security period life table. The probability of receiving an initial disability award is constructed from survival rates and disability incidence rates for 2000 estimated by Motsiopoulos and Zayatz (2001) . They give disability incidence rates broken down into fi ve-year intervals. These were converted into incidence rates at each age by fi rst assuming that disability incidence rates for ages 65 and 66 are equal to those for ages 60-64, and then smoothing the resulting series from age 20-66 using a Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (with smoothing parameter 100).
The probability of remaining on disability was constructed from Zayatz's (1999) detailed study of termination rates by age and duration of disability of workers over the fi ve-year period 1991-1995. These estimates were adjusted to refl ect the experience of workers in 2000 using Motsiopoulos and Zayatz's (2001) estimates of total (age and sex adjusted) incidence rates in 2000.
The wage adjustment factor, rwd (a,n,t) , was based on an annual growth rate of real wages of 1.1 percent, the historic average over the 1960-2000 period. This is the estimate used in the 2002 Trustee's "intermediate cost" scenario and is very close to the 1 percent growth rate assumed in Feldstein and Samwick's work.
The marginal federal income tax rate on Social Security income, τ (a,t), is taken to be 0.075. This is Feldstein and Samwick's benchmark case. It assumes benefi ciaries are in the 15 percent federal income tax bracket and pay taxes on half of their Social Security income.
Because actual Social Security awards are made on a monthly, rather than an annual, basis, three continuity corrections were employed. First, because the award is paid out in monthly installments over the year, rather than at the beginning of the year, all awards are adjusted downward by (1 + r/2) -1 . Second, because individuals whose awards are terminated during the course of a year do not receive the entire annual benefi t, retirement and disability benefi ts in year j are adjusted downward by (1 + Pr s (j|j -1)/2 and (1 + Pr sd (j|j -1)/2, respectively. Third, because new disability awards in a particular year could start at any time, individuals will generally not receive the full annual benefit in the fi rst year. Therefore, benefi t payments in the fi rst year are cut by half, to approximate the average amount of payments received by individuals receiving a disability award in the initial year.
